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Abstract
We conduct a laboratory experiment to test the empirical behavior of the bid-
and-propose mechanism, deﬁned in Navarro and Perea (2005). This mechanism
implements the Myerson value for networks, and therefore its outcome posesses
fairness properties. Since the bid-and-propose mechanism includes an ultimatum
game in the last stage, we design an experiment with several treatments, where
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11 Introduction
The problem of allocating a certain amount of money across players is still a source of
challenging research. The value to be distributed can be thought of as the value of a joint
production, joint bargaining or any type of joint eﬀort by the group of players that can
depend on a hierarchy, a network structure, or any other type of internal organization. We
present here a series of experimental treatments testing the way two individuals bargain
about how to distribute an amount of money available only in case of an agreement. These
treatments are based on a well known bargaining procedure called the ultimatum game.
In the ultimatum game, two players have to agree on how to divide a pie of a given
size. One of them, called the proposer, suggests a division, and the other, the chooser, has
to accept or reject. If the chooser accepts, the division is implemented. If he rejects, they
both get zero. Non-cooperative game theorists and economists assume that players acting
non-cooperatively will always look for the maximization of their own payoﬀs. The (sub-
game perfect Nash) equilibrium of the ultimatum game consists of the proposer proposing
zero (or the smallest amount permitted in the game) to the other player and the chooser
accepting. In most experiments on the ultimatum game (see, among others, the review
in Bearden (2001)) such an equilibrium is almost never observed. The ultimatum game
thus clearly illustrates the conﬂict of the theoretical assumption of pure selﬁsh behavior
of players with empirical ﬁndings on players’ behavior driven by motivations as fairness,
reciprocity or pure altruism. This work contributes to this debate by testing the nature
of fairness considerations by individuals in the context of value division.
Fairness, as an axiom or property, has been formally deﬁned for diﬀerent contexts of
payoﬀ division. In general, it aims at reﬂecting some idea of justice or equity. In the
context of distributing the value of a network among its participants, a division rule is
called fair (Myerson (1977)) if any pair of agents directly connected lose or gain the same
amount of payoﬀ from breaking their connection in the network. Each direct connection
(or link) in the network can be then interpreted as a pair of players who cooperate and
bargain over the gains from creating such bilateral relationship. As such, the axiom of
fairness implies an equal-gains principle, equal bargaining power or a sort of altruistic
2behavior. The so-called Myerson value is the unique division rule (see Myerson (1977),
Feldman (1996), Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Navarro (2007)) satisfying fairness and
distributing the total value of a connected network among its participants.
In the experimental literature testing the accuracy of the subgame perfect equilibrium
as a prediction of behavior in the ultimatum game, it seems that subjects that are in
the position of the chooser reject oﬀers they consider unfair or unacceptable. Therefore
proposers are believed to oﬀer more even distributions either because they are afraid to
be rejected or because they feel their power is not legitimate, as being the proposer or the
chooser is decided randomly. This last argument could also be consistent with the fact
that people spend unearned money in a diﬀerent way that earned money. In line with this
last idea some experiments have been conducted. Players behave more according to the
theory, i.e., less fair, when they have earned their position (see again Bearden (2001)).
We test a game form where the proposer earns his position and the theoretical (sub-
game perfect equilibrium) prediction is fair in the sense of Myerson explained above.
The theoretical bargaining procedure that we call the bid-and-propose game is based on
Navarro and Perea (2005) and develops in two stages as follows:
• Stage 1. Players bid simultaneously for becoming the proposer by submitting a
non-negative number. The player with the highest bid becomes the proposer in the
next stage. Ties are broken with a random device.
• Stage 2. The proposer sends a monetary oﬀer to the chooser. If the latter accepts,
the proposed split is implemented as in the ultimatum game. If the chooser rejects,
they both get zero, moreover the proposer must pay his ﬁrst-stage winning bid to
the chooser.
We test not only the eﬀect of the bidding taking place at the beginning of the game,
but also the eﬀect of the asymmetric outside options on the distributions that are oﬀered,
as, in the context of Myerson, fairness says that two players bargaining directly should
marginally (with respect to outside options) gain the same. This means that a player
with a higher outside option should get more than half of the pie. In order to do that, we
conduct a laboratory experiment with six treatments:
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Two players must divide an amount of money π. One of them, who is randomly
appointed to be the proposer, sends an oﬀer, o, suggesting a division (π − o,o) in
which he receives π − o and the other player receives o monetary units. This other
player, called the chooser, can either accept or reject the proposal. If he accepts,
the amount of money π is split according to the proposal, while if he rejects, neither
player receives anything.
• Treatments 2 and 3. The ultimatum game with asymmetric outside op-
tions
In these treatments the rules of the ultimatum game presented in treatment 1 apply
with the only diﬀerence that if the chooser rejects the oﬀer, players receive their
stand-alone values. In this case one player earns v1 and the other earns v2 monetary
units. In treatment 2, v1 > v2, while in treatment 3 the opposite inequality holds.
• Treatment 4. The bid-and-propose game with zero outside options
This game consists of two stages. In stage 1 players bid to become the proposer in
stage 2. This is done by simultaneously choosing a non-negative number. The player
who has chosen the highest number becomes the proposer. In stage 2 a modiﬁed
version of the ultimatum game is played since the proposer must pay his winning
bid to the chooser.
• Treatments 5 and 6. The bid-and-propose game with asymmetric outside
options
In these treatments the rules of the bid-and-propose game presented in treatment 4
apply, but players earn asymmetric stand-alone values if a rejection happens. That
is, in stage 2 players receive their stand-alone values and the proposer must pay his
winning bid to the chooser.
Our main conclusion is that both outside options have the expected eﬀect. The higher
the outside option for a player, the higher the share of the pie. The eﬀect of the bidding
stage on the ﬁnal share of the pie is partially in line with theory. First, players do not bid
4the same quantity, as subgame perfection predicts, but do so depending on the value of
the outside options. Second, data is consistent with the idea that proposers exploit more
their position when they feel they have gained their position. Third, according to the
theory, choosers have more bargaining power (than in the ultimatum game) as they can
always reject and obtain the bid by the proposer. Consistent with that, choosers do reject
more often for the low oﬀers in the bid and propose mechanism. On average, choosers are
worse oﬀ in the bid-and-propose mechanism, either because exploitation from proposers
is stronger in the bid-and-propose mechanism, or due to the higher rate of rejections.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the theoretical prop-
erties of the bid-and-propose mechanism. Section 3 explains our experimental design,
while section 4 presents the observed data and our main ﬁndings. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Results
In what follows we shall compare our experimental results with the theoretical predictions,
i.e. with the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to be found with backward induction.
For future reference table 1 summarizes the game theoretical results. In the ultimatum
game the chooser accepts any amount that is larger or equal than her stand-alone value.
Knowing this, the proposer should oﬀer the smallest acceptable amount to her, i.e. vCH.
Therefore the equilibrium outcome is (π − vCH;vCH), where the ﬁrst element is the pro-
poser’s payoﬀ while the second one is the chooser’s. In treatment 1 it is (10;0), while
in treatments 2 and 3 it is either (10;0) or (5;5), depending on whether the player with
the higher stand-alone value is lucky or not when roles are assigned by nature. As for
the bid-and-propose game, Navarro and Perea (2005) show that player’s bids in the ﬁrst
stage should coincide and be equal to 1
2(π − s), where s is the sum of the two players’
stand-alone value. In the second stage the chooser should accept any oﬀer that is higher
or equal to her stand-alone value plus the proposer’s bid, since the latter would be paid
to her in case of rejection. Hence, the equilibrium payoﬀ is (π − vCH − bP;vCH + bP).
This is in fact the Myerson value, as bP = 1
2(π−vP −vCH), with vP being the stand-alone
value for the proposer. In treatment 4 it is equal to (5;5), with both players choosing a
5bid of 5, while in treatments 5 and 6 it is either (7.5;2.5) or (2.5;7.5) depending on the
stand-alone value of the proposer (or the chooser), with both players choosing a bid of
2.5.
3 Experimental design
We recruited 22 subjects to a computer lab through announcements posted across the
campus of the Universidad de Navarra in Pamplona, Spain. They were informed that
they would participate in a paid experiment on decision making. The experiment was
programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The session
took place in May, 2007. We implemented two games in six treatments. At the beginning
of each treatment, printed instructions were given to subjects and were read aloud to the
entire room. Instructions explained all rules to determine the resulting payoﬀ for each
participant. They were written in Spanish and contained some numerical examples to
illustrate how the program works. The English translation of the instructions can be
found in the appendix.
At the start of each round the computer randomly assigned subjects to groups of
two. We applied stranger treatment where participants were not informed about who the
other member of their group was. Also, a new assignment was made in every period; hence
participants knew that groups were typically diﬀerent from period to period. Subjects
were not allowed to communicate among themselves; the only information given to them
in this respect was the size of the group.
In the ﬁrst three treatments the ultimatum game was implemented in order to divide 10
monetary units (EMU) between two people in each round, while in the last two treatments
subjects bargained over 10 monetary units according to the rules of the bid-and-propose
game. We decided to sequence treatments in this way because we found it easier to explain
the two-stage bid-and-propose mechanism (to untrained subjects) after the ultimatum
game.
Treatments, with some exceptions, consisted in one practice and 5 paying rounds.
Table 2 oﬀers a brief summary of our treatments for later reference. We allowed for two
6digits in all numerical choices in order to make the decision problem similar to a problem
of dividing real money (Euros) between two people.
In the ﬁrst three treatments subjects were asked to split 10 monetary units in each
round according to the rules of the ultimatum game. The roles of the chooser and the
proposer were assigned in a random way using equal probabilities by the computer. In
treatment 1 subjects received 0 monetary units in case of a rejection, while in treatments
2 and 3 one player in each group received 0 and the other 5 monetary units. We shall refer
to these games as asymmetric games due to the asymmetry in the stand-alone values. In
treatment 2 the ﬁrst 11 subjects’ stand-alone value was equal to 0 and the second 11
subject’s received 5. In treatment 3 we implemented the reversed asymmetric case.
In the last three treatments subjects played a symmetric and two asymmetric versions
of the bid-and-propose game. Asymmetries arose in the stand-alone values, and each
subject played one treatment (5 rounds) having a stand-alone value of 0 and a treatment
having a stand-alone value of 5 monetary units.
For convenience, and in order to keep subjects informed on their performance, the
history of personal earnings appeared after each repetition on screen during the whole
experiment. All computer screens contained payoﬀ simulation tables on the lower part.
In this way, before making their ﬁnal decisions, subjects could simulate their payoﬀs
(both their own payoﬀ and the other player’s payoﬀ) in several hypothetical situations.
In these tables subjects could write the opponent’s strategic choices and their own ones.
Afterwards, by a simple mouse click they obtained information on the ﬁnal results given
the speciﬁed actions.
The session lasted an hour and a half. At the end, participants were paid individually
and privately. Final proﬁts were computed according to a simple conversion rule, 100
experimental monetary units equal EUR 8.5, based on the personal gains in experimental
monetary units during the whole session. Subjects also received a ﬁxed amount of EUR
3 as show-up fee. Taking into account the six treatments, individual net payments (pay-
ments without the show-up fee) ranged from EUR 8.13 to EUR 14.95, with a mean of
EUR 11.73 and a standard deviation of EUR 1.75.
74 Experimental results
In this section we present the statistical analysis of the data that we collected in the
experimental lab. The ﬁrst two subsections consider the global characteristics of the
mechanisms, such as eﬃciency and fairness. The third one oﬀers insight into the empirical
individual decision making process. When talking about diﬀerences we refer to the results
of both the parametric t-tests and the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests. In case it is
not stated otherwise the reported diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at the usual signiﬁcance levels
according to both tests.
4.1 Eﬃciency
Independently on personal payoﬀs, the resulting outcome for both games considered here is
eﬃcient whenever the proposer manages to oﬀer a split of the pie that the chooser decides
to accept in the last stage. Hence, Pareto eﬃciency in our treatments is represented by
the last-stage acceptance rate. We also compute an eﬃciency measure called “realized
eﬃciency” that compares the sum of ﬁnal payoﬀs with the size of the pie being the
largest amount that can be shared by the players.1. Table 3 reports the eﬃciency results.
Due to a smaller rejection rate, the ultimatum game proved to be eﬃcient in a larger
proportion of cases than the bid-and-propose game in the symmetric treatment. Also its
realized eﬃciency measure is signiﬁcantly higher than the one computed for the alternative
mechanism. It is interesting though that we can not prepare a clear eﬃciency ranking in
the asymmetric case, as the observed diﬀerences show both positive and negative signs
that are not signiﬁcant except for one repetition-to-repetition comparison.
4.2 Fairness
The goal of the ultimatum game and the bid-and-propose game is to divide a certain
monetary amount between two players. In this subsection we study ﬁnal payoﬀs, in
particular we compare them to the theoretical predictions. The rules of the ultimatum
game assign all the bargaining power to the proposer, hence the subgame perfect Nash
1This eﬃciency measure frequently appears as “eﬃciency index” in the literature.
8equilibrium outcome cannot be considered fair in general. In particular, in the symmetric
case implemented in treatment 1 and the asymmetric situations where the chooser’s stand-
alone value is zero, it predicts an extreme split of the pie according to which the proposer
keeps practically the whole pie and the chooser has to walk away without anything (or
with a negligible amount). In our treatments the only exception to this is the asymmetric
situation in which the chooser’s stand-alone value is 5, since the solution in that case is
an equal split of the pie. The bid-and-propose game implements a fair split of the pie
that is known as the Myerson value in cooperative game theory. In the symmetric case,
when players’ stand-alone values are equal as in treatment 1, the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium predicts equal shares. In the asymmetric cases, the Myerson value imposes
the same diﬀerence between the ﬁnal payoﬀs as the existing diﬀerence between the stand-
alone values. In treatments 5 and 6 this implies an equilibrium outcome of (2.5;7.5) or
(7.5;2.5) depending whether the ﬁrst or the second player has a stand-alone value of 5
instead of 0.
Experimental evidence shows that people tend to deviate from the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium in the ultimatum game and the pie is usually split such that the proposer
gets 60% and the chooser 40%.2 This outcome can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium
(see Gale, Binmore and Samuelson (1995)) and there also exists a vast literature that
rationalize its supporting strategies. Gale, Binmore and Samuelson (1995) show that trial-
and-error learning can lead the ultimatum repeated game framework to Nash equilibria
that are not the subgame perfect. They point out that the puzzle in the experiments
comes from the choice of subgame perfection as the rationality concept for subjects, as
in any Nash equilibrium selﬁshness is present. More utilitarian approaches can be found,
among others, in Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000), where subjects’ utility functions reﬂect preferences for altruism (they
like being good to others), reciprocity (they like being good to good people and mean to
mean people) or justice (they like being treated fairly). Feelings of reciprocity or justice
incorporated in the responders utility function suﬃce for payoﬀ-maximizing proposers to
make positive oﬀers, as proposers want to make an acceptable oﬀer to the responder.
2We refer to Oosterbeek et al. (2004) who present a meta-analysis of utlimatum game experiments.
9Our data with results summarized in tables 5 and 6 conﬁrm this, since the proposer’s
payoﬀ in treatment 1 is equal to 4.37 in expected terms and to 5.59 if we only consider
the accepted ones. The chooser’s is signiﬁcantly smaller being 3.45 across the whole
treatment3, and 4.41 if only accepted proposals are considered. Asymmetry in the stand-
alone values has an important eﬀect on behavior. Final payoﬀs tend to be less balanced,
but do not reach the extremes predicted by the subgame perfect equilibrium. A proposer
with 0 stand-alone value expects 2.83 (a chooser 5.73) while with a value of 5 this result
is 5.98 (for a chooser 3.53). When considering accepted oﬀers only, these numbers are
3.97 and 6.09. In this case choosers get what is left from the pie.
The bid-and-propose game slightly modiﬁed the patterns observed in the ultimatum
game treatments. Payoﬀs moved in the expected direction, nevertheless they did not reach
the equilibrium level. Part B in tables 5 and 6 show that proposers earn signiﬁcantly less
2.54 and choosers get practically the same 3.46 in treatment 4 as compared to treatment
14. When looking at the eﬃcient results only these numbers are 5.94 and 4.06, and they
increase with the stand-alone value.5
4.3 Individual behavior
In what follows we report empirical results as for bidding, proposals and acceptance
decisions.
Tables 8 and 10 show that subjects tend to bid low in the bidding stage of the bid-
and-propose mechanism. The numbers we recorded are signiﬁcantly smaller than the
equilibrium bids, however the diﬀerence between bids in treatment 4 and treatments 5-6
shows the expected sign. There is a signiﬁcant6 diﬀerence between the symmetric and the
asymmetric treatments and also stand-alone values seem to inﬂuence bids in a positive
3Although the p-value for this comparison with the parametric t-test is of 7%
4The p-value here for the comparison between proposer and chooser is of 3% for the parametric test
and 6% for the non-parametric
5We tested the observed diﬀerences in payoﬀs between the two mechanisms both parametrically and
non-parametrically. It turns out that the number reported in the mean rows of tables 5 and 6 are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent when considering all the oﬀers or the ones made by a proposer with 0 stand-alone
value in the symmetric case. If we look at the accepted oﬀers, the payoﬀ diﬀerence in the symmetric
treatments loses signiﬁcance.
6For all usual signiﬁcance level both according to the parametric t-test and the non-parametric Kruskal-
Wallis test.
10way in the latter case. In the bid-and-propose mechanism the proposer enjoys more
bargaining power than the chooser. Nevertheless bidding in the auction stage reduces the
proposer’s bargaining power as the winning bid increases the chooser‘s stand alone value.
It seems that our subjects undervalued the proposer‘s power and bid less than expected.
The diﬀerence explained by the stand-alone values is signiﬁcant and is also conﬁrmed
by the regression analysis in the ﬁrst column of table 10.7 The goodness of ﬁt of the
regressions in the same table proves that bids tend to depend on the sum of the stand-
alone values rather than on the individual ones. This is in line with theory. These results
are represented graphically in ﬁgure 5, which plots the average bid across treatments
separating cases according to the stand-alone value of the proposer. Theory suggests that
players send the same number as bid in the ﬁrst stage of the game. Nevertheless our
data show that bids are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between players, although this diﬀerence is
smaller in the asymmetric case as show in table 9.8
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for oﬀers for all treatments. When considered
together with the regression analysis in table 12 we can conclude that subjects tend to
present balanced oﬀers and do not make use of their bargaining power in an extreme way
as predicted by theory. Nevertheless the observed changes in proposing behavior across
treatments conﬁrms our expectations, as proposers do oﬀer signiﬁcantly less as their
bargaining power, i.e. their stand-alone value, increases. These results are also conﬁrmed
by the regression results reported in table 12 that combines the database and considers
the two games together. Figures 1 and 2 represent the same results graphically. According
to the estimated parameters in table 4 oﬀers are sensibly smaller in the bid-and-propose
game, that is in line with the theoretical results.
In the vast majority of the cases players notice the proposer’s bargaining power and
try to make advantage of it as described in the previous subsection, even if it is not done
in an extreme way. Numbers presented in table 7 give more insight into this facts. In
the symmetric ultimatum game, for example, 86% of the oﬀers is smaller than the half of
7It is important to point out that the estimates of the second column in table 10 may be severely
biased since the equilibrium bid changes radically from the symmetric to the asymmetric version even if
the outside option remain constant and equal to 0.
8The diﬀerence between the symmetric and the asymmetric case is signiﬁcant at any usual signiﬁcance
level.
11the pie. It is quite diﬃcult to explain why a proposer would oﬀer more than half of the
available money in such a situation, nevertheless it occurred in 14% of the times as shown
in table 7. In the asymmetric treatments the distribution of oﬀers concentrated over the
upper or lower half of the support depending on the proposer’s stand-alone value with
some clear outliers. For instance, 14% of all the oﬀers made by a proposer with stand-
alone value of 5 were between 6.00 and 7.00 units. Again it is diﬃcult to understand the
reasoning behind these actions, since in these cases the proposer would gain more money
with a rejection than with an acceptance. Still, he is sending a fairly generous oﬀer to the
chooser. A comment on our experimental design is now in order. The written instructions,
the computer screens and also the answers delivered by the experimenter to the questions
in the lab emphasized that oﬀers represent the monetary amount that is oﬀered to the
chooser. Therefore the possibility of proposers behind these 14% not understanding the
rules of the game is fairly small.
There is an interesting diﬀerence between proposals in the symmetric games. Table 4
shows that oﬀers vary less in the bid-and-propose game. According to data in table 7 this
fact is due to the lack of proposals lower than 1 or higher than 7. Extremely small oﬀers
are not made since in case of rejection the chooser would almost always get a slightly
larger amount. Note that ﬁrst-stage bids amount to 1.87 monetary units on average.
Oﬀers on the other extreme do not make sense according to game theory. Nevertheless,
extremely high oﬀers do occur in the ultimatum game and do not do so in the bid-and-
propose game. Proposers might think they have earned the right to propose through the
competition in the auction of the ﬁrst stage and therefore feel less guilty about oﬀering
smaller amounts of money. This eﬀect is also present in the asymmetric games: The
regression analysis in tables 14 and 15 suggests that being a proposer does not imply
higher payoﬀs in general (the estimated coeﬃcients corresponding to “proposer” in the
second column are not signiﬁcant), but it does so in the bid-and-propose game. Moreover
this diﬀerence is around 0.8 monetary units.
Given the results in table 14 we cannot conﬁrm that the proposer enjoys a greater
bargaining power. Even though it is not an equilibrium behavior, rejections do occur in
the lab and with this the chooser is able to equilibrate the situation. This argument is
12conﬁrmed by the estimation results in table 15 when considering the merged database
and both the symmetric and the asymmetric games. In the bid-and-propose game the
bargaining power is balanced by design, i.e. by the presence of the bidding stage prior
to the ultimatum. If we look exclusively at the asymmetric games the proposer seems to
enjoy a clear advantage in the bid-and-propose game.
Acceptance thresholds and therefore acceptance probabilities are expected to be in-
creasing in the amount oﬀered by the proposer. This tendency is present in table 7, even
if not in a perfect way due to the small number of observations (and therefore to the
relatively high variance of the data). Results from the regression analysis of acceptance
decisions stated in table 13 show that the amount of the oﬀer has a positive eﬀect on the
acceptance probability. In line with our expectations, data show that the chooser’s stand-
alone value and the proposer’s ﬁrst-stage bid (being a potential gain for the chooser) aﬀect
negatively the acceptance probabilities. Figures 4 and 5 deliver graphical argument con-
cerning the acceptance rate. Even though our data does not allow us to perform a serious
time series analysis graphs 1 through 4 suggest that choosers‘ behavior was more hectic
than proposers‘, as if choosers tried to (unsuccessfully) achieve more generous oﬀers, while
proposers stuck to the same.
Connecting the three strategic parts: bidding, oﬀers and acceptance rejection in the
bid-and-propose game the following features are observed. From table 8 we can observe
the maximum bids that are taking place. In the symmetric bid-and-propose game, all
bids are at most equal to 5. Proposers can guarantee a payoﬀ of at least 5, assuming
the chooser accepts oﬀers covering at least her outside option and the bid. Note that
95% of the oﬀers in the symmetric bid-and-propose game are at most 5, but only 57%
of them are accepted. In the asymmetric bid-and-propose games, bids are at most equal
to 2 when the outside-option is equal to 0, and to 3 when the outside option is equal
to 5. Again, assuming that choosers accept oﬀers covering outside options and bids, a
proposer with an outside option equal to 0 facing a chooser with an outside option equal
to 5 can guarantee a payoﬀ of at least 3 (the bid is at most 2), while a proposer with an
outside option equal to 5 facing a chooser with an outside option equal to 0 can guarantee
a payoﬀ of at least 7 (the bid is at most 3). Proposers with outside option equal to 0 do
13not oﬀer above 7, although only 62% of the oﬀers are accepted. Proposers with outside
option equal to 5 never oﬀer above 5 (more generous than oﬀering at most 3) and 84% of
oﬀers are accepted.
5 Conclusions
It seems that subjects agree on a 40-60 split of the pie, being the proposer the person
getting the 60% of the pie when the game is symmetric or asymmetric in his favor, and
the chooser otherwise for the ultimatum game. When looking at the bid-and-propose
game, it seems that the division gets close to the 30-70 division, more extreme than in
the ultimatum game, but not as extreme as the 25-75 division predicted by the theory.9
We can conclude that the higher the outside option for a player, the higher the share of
the pie. The eﬀect of the bidding stage on the ﬁnal share of the pie is partially according
to the theory. First, players do not bid the same quantity, as subgame perfection predicts,
but do so depending on their value of their outside option. Second, recall that the rules
of the game make the bid being paid by the proposer only in case of a rejection. This
makes the chooser more powerful in the bid-and-propose bargaining procedure than in the
simple ultimatum game. In light of the average payoﬀs, we cannot say that choosers do
get higher payoﬀs (on average) in the bid and propose mechanism than in the ultimatum
game. They do get higher payoﬀs only in the asymmetric cases where the proposer gets
smaller outside option. Taking general averages, on either all oﬀers or only accepting
oﬀers, proposers gain more than choosers in the bid-and-propose mechanism than in the
simple ultimatum game. In light of the distribution of oﬀers and acceptance-rejections
decisions, we observe that, although choosers tend to reject more often in the low range of
oﬀers (less than half), oﬀers tend to be lower in the bid-and-propose mechanism. These
observations are consistent with previous experiments in which proposers tend to exploit
more their position when they feel they have earned their position. On the other hand,
the fact that choosers reject more often in the bid-and-propose mechanism (for the same
9The presence of an additional stage in the bid-and-propose game may constitute a feature that makes
observations divert from the subgame perfect prediction, as those equilibria require complex computations
from subjects. With our design we are unable to separate the eﬀect of complexity from others that imply
deviations from the predicted equilibrium behavior. We leave this question open for further analysis.
14range of oﬀers, looking at the lower half of them) is consitent with the fact that winning
bids by the proposer become an instrument to give more power to the chooser in the oﬀer
stage. To some extant, the fact that choosers end up with lower payoﬀ could be driven
by the fact that they reject more. Nevertheless, proposers end up with higher payoﬀs
in the bid-and-propose mechanism than in the ultimatum game, which suggests that the
explotation eﬀect is more important than the “protecting the chooser” eﬀect expected
from the theory.
References
[1] Bearden, J. N. (2001), “Ultimatum bargaining experiments: The state of the art”,
mimeo
[2] Bolton, G. E., Ockenfels, A. (2000), “A theory of equity, reciprocity and competi-
tion”, American economic review, 90: 166-193.
[3] Feldman, B. E. (1996), Bargaining, coalition formation and value”, Ph.D. Disserta-
tion, State University of New York at Stony Brook
[4] Fehr, E. & K. M. Schmidt (1999), “A theory of fairness, competition and coopera-
tion”, Quarterly journal of economic,s 114: 817-868.
[5] Fischbacher, U. (2007), “z-Tree - Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments
- Experimenter’s manual”, Experimental Economics, 2: 171-178.
[6] Gale, J., Binmore, K.G., Samuelson, L. (1995), “Learning to be imperfect: the ulti-
matum game”, Games and economic behavior, 8: 56-90.
[7] Jackson, M. O. (2005), “Allocation rules for network games”, Games and Economic
Behavior, 51: 128-154.
[8] Jackson, M. O., Wolinsky, A. (1996), “A strategic model of social and economic
networks”, J. Econ. Theory, 71: 44-74.
15[9] Levine, D. K. (1998), “Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments”, Review
of economic dynamics, 1: 593-622.
[10] Myerson, R. B. (1977), “Graphs and cooperation in games”, Mathematics of Opera-
tions Research, 2: 225-229.
[11] Navarro, N. (2007), “Fair allocation in networks with externalities”, Games and
Economic Behavior, 58: 354-364.
[12] Navarro, N., Perea, A. (2005), “Bargaining in networks and the Myerson value”,
mimeo.
[13] Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., van de Kuilen, G. (2004), “Cultural diﬀerences in ultima-
tum game experiments: Evidence from a meta-analysis”, Experimental Economics,
7: 171-188.
[14] Rabin, M. (1993), “Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics”, Ameri-
can Economic Review, 83: 1281-1302 .
166 Tables
Table 1: Theoretical predictions: subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Bids of the two players
coincide in the equilibrium of the bid-and-propose game. Acceptance: the chooser accepts
any oﬀer higher or equal to the threshold indicated in the table. vCH represents the stand-
alone value of the chooser, it equals either 0 or 5.
treatment bids oﬀer acceptance
treatment 1 - 0 0
treatments 2-3 - vCH vCH
treatment 4 5 5 5
treatments 5-6 2.5 vCH + 2.5 vCH + 2.5
Table 2: Experimental design: Summary of treatments. Repetitions: number of practice
rounds between parenthesis. Stand-alone-values: in the asymmetric cases the ﬁrst number
represents the value for the ﬁrst 11 subjects, while the second the value for the second 11.
game repetitions stand-alone values
treatment 1 ultimatum (1)+5 symmetric (0;0)
treatment 2 ultimatum (1)+5 asymmetric (0;5)
treatment 3 ultimatum (0)+5 asymmetric (5;0)
treatment 4 bid-and-propose (1)+10 symmetric (0;0)
treatment 5 bid-and-propose (1)+5 asymmetric (0;5)
treatment 6 bid-and-propose (0)+5 asymmetric (5;0)
17Table 3: Eﬃciency results. Eﬃciency: proportion of acceptance decisions. Realized
eﬃciency: sum of individual payoﬀs as a proportion of the total monetary amount to
be distributed. Diﬀerence in eﬃciency between the two games: **Signiﬁcant at 10%.
**Signiﬁcant at 5%. ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
ultimatum bid-and-propose
treatment period eﬃciency realized eﬃciency eﬃciency realized eﬃciency
symmetric 1 82%** 82%** 55%** 55%**
2 82% 82% 64% 64%
3 73%* 73%* 45%* 45%*
4 82%* 82%* 55%* 55%*
5 73% 73% 73% 73%
6 - - 64% 64%
7 - - 64% 64%
8 - - 82% 82%
9 - - 64% 64%
10 - - 36% 36%
symmetric 1-10 78%*** 78%*** 60%*** 60%***
asymmetric 1 82% 91% 73% 86%
2 77%** 89% 55%** 77%
3 82% 91% 77% 89%
4 82% 91% 86% 93%
5 77% 89% 77% 89%





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Table 8: Bids (EMU) in the bid-and-propose game. v - stand-alone value (0/5)
symmetric asymmetric
all v = 0 v = 5
mean 1.87 0.50 0.39 0.65
st.dev. 1.06 0.69 0.50 0.81
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
max 5.00 3.00 2.00 3.00
obs. 220 220 110 110
Table 9: Diﬀerence between bids (EMU) in the bid-and-propose game. Diﬀerences are







23Table 10: Regression analysis of bids. Dependent variable: bids. Regressors: v - stand-




constant 0.39*** 1.36*** 1.87***
v 0.06*** -0.14*** -
v + vother - - -0.27***
obs. 220 440 440
R2 0.05 0.07 0.37
adj. R2 0.05 0.07 0.37
p-value (F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 11: Auction results in the bid-and-propose game. Number of cases and %. v -
stand-alone value (0/5)
v proposer chooser total
0 58 52 110
26.36% 23.64% 50.00%
5 52 58 110
23.64% 26.36% 50.00%




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Thank you for participating in this experiment.10 This session has 4 diﬀerent games.
Before each of them the corresponding instructions will be read aloud and we will answer
the questions that may arise. Afterwards we will play a trial period and then other 5-10
periods that will determine a part of the money that you will receive by the end of the
experiment.
In each game and in each repetition groups of two people will be formed randomly.
Therefore it is very likely that you will be playing with a diﬀerent person in each repetition.
Your task is to make individual decisions about how to share a certain amount of money
and for this reason you are not allowed to talk to other participants. The result of your
choices will aﬀect the amount of money that you earn in each game. 100 experimental
monetary units will be exchanged for 8.5 euros. Remember that apart from that you get
3 euros from participating in the experiment.
7.1 Game 1
In this game the computer will randomly assign the roles of “proposer” and “chooser”
between the two players that form the group. The “proposer” will have to decide how to
divide 10 monetary units. Then the “chooser” can express his agreement or disagreement
with the proposal.
If you are the “proposer” you will have to choose a number between 0 and 10 (numbers
up to two decimals permitted) that represents the amount that you oﬀer to the other
player of your group. Write your proposal in the purple cell of the table that appears on
the top of the screen and click on “OK”.
The “chooser” will receive the oﬀer and will have to decide whether to accept it or reject
it. In case of acceptance the proposed split of the 10 monetary units will be implemented.
In case of rejection both the “proposer” and the “chooser” will get 0 monetary units. For
this reason we say that players alone can obtain 0, while together they can obtain 10
monetary units.
10Translated from Spanish.
34In order to make your decision easier each screen oﬀers additional information on the
bottom part. On the “proposer”’s screen you can compute the ﬁnal payoﬀs for diﬀerent
hypothetical situations just by writing an oﬀer in the purple cell of the table on the bottom
and clicking “Compute”. Results of the hypothetical game will appear immediately on
the right showing payoﬀs in case of acceptance and rejection. The “chooser”’s screen also
includes an informative table on the bottom that shows payoﬀs in case of acceptance and
rejection.
Once decisions have been made a screen with the results will appear. By clicking on
“OK” you proceed to the next repetition of the game in which other 10 monetary units
will have to be shared.
7.2 Game 2
The rules of this game are identical to the rules of the previous one, but in case of rejection
one of the players will get 5 monetary units, while the other will get 0 as before.
After the trial period you will play 10 repetitions of this game. In 5 of these repetitions
you will be the player who gets 0 monetary units in case of rejection (while your adversary,
who, remember, is a diﬀerent person in each repetition, gets 5). In the other 5 repetitions
you will be the player who gets 5 monetary units in case of rejection (now it is the other
player in your group who gets 0).
7.3 Game 3
This game is based in the previous one, but it has an extra stage previous to the money
division. In this case it won’t be the computer, but the two players in each group who
decide who will be the “proposer” and who will be the “chooser”. This decision is made
through a special auction.
In the ﬁrst stage of the game players will have to choose their bids: a number between
0 and 10 (numbers up to two decimals permitted). The player withe the largest bid will
become the “proposer”, while the other will be the “chooser”. Since this is a special
auction, bids are not paid in the ﬁrst period of this game. In case of a tie the computer
35will assign the roles randomly.
In the second stage the “proposer” will have to choose his proposal that later the
“chooser” either accepts or rejects. In case of acceptance the proposed split is imple-
mented. In case of rejection the 10 monetary units are lost, moreover the “proposer” will
have to pay his bid (the one that he won the ﬁrst stage auction with) to the “chooser”.
That is, players individually can achieve 0, while together 10 monetary units.
In order to make your decision easier each screen includes simulation tables (or infor-
mative tables) on the bottom part. Use the “Compute” button to study the ﬁnal payoﬀs
of the game in several hypothetical cases.
After ﬁnishing the game the screen with the results will appear. In you click on “OK”
the computer will proceed to the next repetition of the game.
7.4 Game 4
The rules of this game are identical to the rules of the previous one, but in case of rejection
one of the players will get 5 monetary units, while the other will get 0 as before. Moreover,
in case of rejection the “proposer” will have to pay his bid to the “chooser” just as before.
After the trial period you will play 10 repetitions of this game. In 5 of these repetitions
you will be the player who gets 0 monetary units in case of rejection (while your adversary,
who, remember, is a diﬀerent person in each repetition, gets 5). In the other 5 repetitions
you will be the player who gets 5 monetary units in case of rejection (now it is the other
player in your group who gets 0).
36